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5

IN

THE

SUPREME

OF

THE

STATE

COURT

OF

UTAH

F. MELL WHITNEY,
Plaintiff-Appellant
vs.
Case No. 15682

THE BOARD OF REVIEW OF THE
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF
UTAH,
Defendant-Respondent

DEFENDANT'S

BRIEF

STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
This is an action before the Supreme Court of Utah pursuant to U.C.A.
35-4-10(i) (1953), as amended, for the ?urpose of judicial review of a decision
of the Board of Review of the Industrial Commission of Utah, affirming the decision of the Appeal Referee, which denied benefits to the Plaintiff for a period
of 52 weeks and assessed an overpayment on the grounds the Plaintiff knowingly
withheld material facts regarding work and earnings in order to receive benefits
to which he was not entitled.

The questions raised on appeal are whether Plain-

tiff has a "vested right" to unemployment benefits and whether the findings of
fact are supported by the evidence.
DISPOSITION BY THE BOARD OF REVIEW
Plaintiff was disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits from
November 14, 1976, to November 12, 1977, a period of 52 weeks, and was assessed
an overpayment in the amount of $1,147.00 for benefits received during the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
- 1 Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

disqualification period by determination of a Department Hearing Representative
dated October 3, 1977.

By decision dated December 13, 1977, an Appeal Referee

affirmed the determination of the Hearing Representative.

The decision of the

Appeal Referee was affirmed by the Board of Review in a decision dated January 31,
1978, in Case No. 77-A-4231, 77-BR-312.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON REVIEW
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the decisionsof the Board of Review and
the Commission.

Defendant seeks affirmation of such decisions.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

The Plaintiff originally filed a claim for unemployment benefits effective August 1, 1976.

(R.0047)

Based upon earnings from Deseret Mortuary

the Plaintiff was determined to be monetarily eligible to receive benefits in
the amount of $105.00 per week, not to exceed $3,570.00.

(R.0046)

Plaintiff was hospitalized from September 29 to October 9, 1976, for
treatment of varicose veins.

(R.0015, 0019, 0045)

On

September 27, 1976, a

psychiatric evaluation was made of Plaintiff to determine whether he could withstand surgery (R.0026; CAPPS Mental Status Examination), and Plaintiff made other
visits to a psychiatrist.

(R.0019, 0025, 0030)

As part of his treatment the

Plaintiff underwent surgery; however, the record is unclear as to when the
surgery occurred, with various dates being indicated:

September 29, 1976

(R.0015), October 18, 1976 (R.0025), December 20, 1976 (R.0019).
Plaintiff's claim for unemployment benefits was reopened effective
October 17, 1976, and he continued to receive benefits through November 27,
1976.

(R.0013)

On

November 18, 1976, the Plaintiff became employed by Z.C.M.I.
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in Salt Lake City, earning $28.50 during the calendar week ended November 20 and
$120.00 during the calendar week ended November 27, 1976.

(R.0028, 0036)

Plain-

tiff filed claims for benefits for each of those weeks, certifying thereon that
he had no work or earnings.

(R.0042, 0043)

On his claim for the calendar week

ended December 4, 1976, Plaintiff reported that he had started work with Z.C.M.I.
on November 29, 1976.

(R.0044)

Defendant paid benefits to Plaintiff pursuant

to his claims for the weeks ended November 20 and November 27, 1976, by warrants
numbered 762199 and 774393, respectively.

(R.0013)

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THAT IN REVIEWING DETERMINATIONS OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
UNDER THE UTAH EMPLOYMENT SECURITY ACT THE COURT WILL AFFIRM
THE COMMISSION FINDINGS IF SUCH ARE SUSTAINED BY SUBSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE.
The standard of review in unemployment insurance cases is well established.

Section 35-4-10(i), Utah Code Annotated 1953, provides in part:
In any judicial proceedings under this section the findings
of the Commission and the Board of Review as to the facts if
supported by evidence shall be conclusive and the jurisdiction
of said court shall be confined to questions of law.
This court has consistently held that where the findings of the Com-

mission and the Board of Review are supported by evidence, they will not be
disturbed.

MaPtinez v. BoaPd of Review, 25

u.

2d 131, 477 P. 2d 587 (1970).

A reversal of an order of the Department denying compensation can only be justified if there is no substantial evidence to sustain the determination and the
facts giving rise to a right to compensation are so persuasive that the Department's denial was clearly capricious, arbitrary, and unreasonable.

Kenneaott

·
Emp'~oyees v. Dep~tment
of EmpLoyment SeaUJ'ity, 13 U. 2d 262,
Coppep COPporat&on
~
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372 P. 2d 987 (1962); Goake v. Wiesley, 18 U. 2d 245, 420 P. 2d 44, 45 (1966).
This court stated in Members of Iron Worker's Union of Provo v. Industrial

Commission, 104 U. 242, 248; 139 P. 2d 208, 211 (1943) that:
If there is substantial competent evidence to sustain the
findings and decision of the Industrial Commission, this
court may not set aside the decision even though on a review
of the record we might well have reached a different result.
The court has adhered to this same standard of review in cases involving violation of Section 35-4-5(e) of the Employment Security Act.

Deaker

v. Industrial Commission of Utah, Department of Employment Security, 533 P. 2d
898 (1975); Whitaome v. Department of Employment Security, Industrial Commission

of Utah, 564 P. 2d 1116 (1977).
POINT II
CONTINUED ELIGIBILITY FOR UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE BENEFITS
IS DETERMINED FROM WEEK TO WEEK BASED ON INFORMATION PROVIDED BY A CLAIMANT ON THE WEEKLY CLAIM FORMS AND PROVIDED
HE IS NOT OTHERWISE DISQUALIFIED.
The Utah Employment Security Act was enacted to establish a program
of unemployment insurance to lighten the burdens of unemployment and maintain
purchasing power in the economy.

Singer Sewing Maahine Company v. Industrial

Commission, 104 U. 175, 134 P. 2d 479, rehearing denied 104 U. 196, 141 P. 2d
694 (1943); Lexes v. Industrial Commission, 121 U. 550, 243 P. 2d 964 (1952);

Johnson v. Board of Review of the Industrial Commission, 7 U. 2d 113, 320 P.
2d 315 (1958).

The statute contains a scheme for computing the amount of bene-

fits to which each claimant is entitled and provides for disqualification when
certain conditions are present.
The procedure for computing the amount of benefits to which a claimant
is entitled is found in Section 35-4-3, U.C.A. 1953.

Pursuant thereto, the
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Department of Employment Security, upon receiving an initial claim and the
necessary wage information for determining the base period wage credits, proceeds to compute the weekly benefit amount and the maximum benefit
available to the claimant.

~nt

The determination of those amounts is then mailed

to the claimant to advise him of his potential entitlement, as illustrated by
Form 605, Notice of Monetary Determination.

(R.0046)

However, the issuance

of a Notice of Monetary Determination does not give rise to a "vested right"
in the claimant, but only advises of the weekly benefit amount and the maximum
benefits for which the claimant may become eligible.
Section 35-4-4, U.C.A. 1953, as amended, provides in part:
4. An unemployed individual shall be eligible to receive
benefits with respect to any week only if it has been found
by the commission that:
(a) He has made a claim for benefits with respect to such
week in accordance with such regulations as the commission
may prescribe.
The balance of Section 4 relates to other requirements for eligibility.

Section

5 of the Employment Security Act provides for conditions of ineligibility under
which a claimant becomes disqualified from receiving benefits.
Plaintiff has alleged a "vested right" to unemployment benefits in the
amount of $3,570.00 by virtue of the Notice of Monetary Determination.

(R.0004)

In order for a right to be vested, it must be absolute, complete, unconditional,
and not subject to any contingency.
Law, Section 215.

16 Corpus Juris Seaundum, Constitutional

However, nothing in the Notice of Monetary Determination, in

the Employment Security Act, or in any of the material given to the Plaintiff in
connection with his claim, suggests that there is an absolute or unconditional
right to the maximum benefit amount.

To the contrary, the statute is explicit

in setting forth the conditions upon which a claimant obtains eligibility for or
is disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits.
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Plaintiff also alleges that he received no instructions with respect
to the procedures for filing claims.

In this regard .it is sufficient to note

that this case arises from a failure by the Plaintiff to report his work and
earnings for the weeks ended November 20 and November 27, 1976.

The weekly claim

cards contain simple, unequivocal tnstructfons which require every claimant to
report all work and earnings, setting forth the hours worked each day and the
gross amount of earnings, whether paid or not.
~iff

(R.0042, 0043, 0044)

That Plain-

understood these instructions is evident from the fact that he reported such

information, including an erroneous back-to-work date, on his claim for the week
ended December 4, 1976,

(R.0044)

More will be said in this regard in Point III

hereof.
Plaintiff further contends that he was improperly advised as to the
effect of an admission he allegedly made at his first hearing.
Brief, page 9.)

(See Plaintiff's

Defendants concede that reference is made to such an admission

in the decision of the hearing representative.

(R.0034)

However, the propriety

of instruction and lack of counsel at the timethe alleged admission was made are
both immaterial for the reason that the Appeal Referee did not refer to the
alleged admission in its decision, nor was it made a part of the record.

Thus,

the alleged admission was not a basis for the decision appealed by Plaintiff and
is not relied upon by Defendants as part of the proof of the violation charged
to the Plaintiff.
POINT III
THE DECISION OF THE BOARD OF REVIEW IS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE AND THE BOARD AND APPEAL REFEREE DID NOT ERR IN DETERMINING THAT PLAINTIFF KNOWINGLY WITHHELD MATERIAL INFORMATION
IN ORDER TO OBTAIN BENEFITS TO WHICH HE WAS NOT ENTITLED.
Section 35-4-5(e) of the Utah Employment Security Act, Utah Code
Annotated
1953, as amended, provides:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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5. An individual shall be ineligible for benefits or for
purposes of establishing a waiting period:
(e) For the week with respect to which he had willfully
made a false statement or representation or knowingly failed
to report a material fact to obtain any benefit under the
provisions of this act, and for the 51-week period immediately following and until he has repaid to the fund all monies he received by reason of his fraud and which he received
during such following 51-week disqualification period, provided that determinations under this subsection shall be
made only upon a sworn written admission, or after due notice
and recorded hearing; provided that when a claimant waives
the recorded hearing a determination shall be made based
upon all of the facts which the commission, exercising due
diligence, has been able to obtain; and provided further
that such determination shall be appealable in the manner
provided by this act for appeals from other benefit determinations.
Plaintiff contends on appeal that the decision of the Board of Review
is not sustained by the evidence.

The primary thrust of this contention appears

to emanate from the fact that Plaintiff underwent psychiatric evaluation and
treatment during the approximate time period in which the incidences of fraud
occurred.
There is no dispute that Plaintiff worked during the weeks ended
November 20 and November 27, 1976, or that he earned $28.50 and $120.00 during
those respective weeks.

(R.0028)

Indeed, Plaintiff concedes in his Petition

for Review, paragraph 4, that he was overpaid for the weeks in question.

(R.0004)

The ultimate question at issue in this matter is whether or not the evidence is
sufficient to support a finding that Plaintiff harbored the requisite intent at
the time of filing the questioned claims so as to become subject to the disqualifying provisions of Section 5(e) of the Employment Security Act.

It has

previously been held that intention to defraud is inherent in the claims themselves when such claims contain false statements and fail to set forth material
information required by statute.

Martinez v. Industrial Commission, Utah, 576

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization
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P. 2d 1295 (1978).

The filing of such a claim is in and of itself a manifesta-

tion of intent to defraud.

~neer

v. Board of Review of the IndustriaZ Commie-

sian of Utah, Utah, 572 P. 2d 1364 (1977).
In the instant matter the Appeal Referee and Board of Review properly
inferred from the

c~rcumstances

of the case that, despite Plaintiff's suffering

from emotional stress and strain, the elements of knowledge and intent were
both present.
The Plaintiff filed his claims for the weeks ended November 20 and
November 27, 1976, showing in each "zeros" in the boxes wherein he should have
reported his hours of work, and the words "none" in the boxes where he should
have reported his gross earnings.

The fact that Plaintiff made entries in

spaces provided for reporting work and earnings demonstrates that he had read
that portion of the claim card and understood that an entry should be made
therein.

When the Administrative Law Judge in California inquired of the

Plaintiff as to why he did not report his work and earnings, Plaintiff's answer
was vague, evasive, and self-serving:
Administrative Law Judge:

You were required to fill out a
Continued Claim Card, uh, for the
weeks ended November 20, 1976,
and November 27, 1976, uh, and
apparently on that card or cards
for those two weeks you did not
show that you had worked or earned
any wages.

Claimant:

Uh, that I felt was the period that
I was still living with my son in
Salt Lake and that he was paying
my full support, and for that reason
they said there would be a waiting
period until, uh, this claim was
allowed. So that's the reason I
reported. (R.0029)

It is unclear to what "waiting period" the Plaintiff was referring, but his
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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answer suggests that the reason he withheld the information of his work and
earnings was the possibility of delay in receiving benefits.

It should be noted

that Plaintiff's claim had been reopened effective October 17, 1976, and that he
received benefits continuously through November 27, 1976.
point in the claim series there was no

"w~iting

(R.0013)

At that

period" for which Plaintiff

would have been required to await the receipt of benefits.
In addition to the response Plaintiff gave the California Administrative Law Judge, which is quoted above, the Plaintiff, at an earlier point in the
hearing, provided an equally vague, evasive, and self-serving response to a very
similar question:
Administrative Law Judge:

All right now. When, uh, Mr.
Floyd, the other Administrative
Law Judge, who listened to your
testimony on August 30, 1977, when
he asked you, uh, a question, uh,
as to why you collected unemployment benefots (sic) for these
weeks in which you worked without
reporting all of your wages, uh,
apparently you told him it was
because you needed the money.

Claimant:

Uh, that was because I had not
been advised nor did I read the
things, the materials and the,
uh, written evidence such as
letter, time cards, payroll, and
personnel records and physician
statements of health if health is
an issue, he didn't bother going
into that. Mr. Floyd was very,
very brief and so he represented
that if I would make a statement
at that time that I had received
these monies for this time worked
that that would probably be all
that the, uh, appeals board would
need in Utah. However, I feel
that because of the great, uh,
emotional stress and the fact that
I was living with my son and his

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization
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family, that they were the sole
support of myself, uh, uh, you
know, to include food, shelter, and
everything else there that I owed
them, uh, something for that, and
this is what I made the statement
based on, but I had not the slightest
idea that they would deny all of the
benefits under the eligibility in
the State of Utah that I was to
receive because of this short period
of time that I had worked during the
holidays. Uh, in fact, as I showed
you, Mr. Fielding, I have the eligibility card with me that shows
$3,570.00 in maximum benefits that
should be paid to me from the State
of Utah for, uh, the work that I
had done there for Deseret Mortuary
just based on that alone. So, in
no way do I feel that, uh, I am
liable for this $1,147.00. Uh,
absolutely no way, uh, I would take
that to an attorney, I would not,
uh, agree to pay that amount back,
uh, under any conditions ••
(R.0028) (Emphasis added.)
That Plaintiff had knowledge of his responsibility to report his
work and earnings is evidenced by the fact that he made "zero" and "none"
entries in the appropriate boxes of the claim cards in question.

Furthermore,

immediately after the week in question Plaintiff reported his work and earnings
for the week ended December 4, 1976.

(But note that Plaintiff reported earnings

of $192.00, when he actually earned $120.00 according to the employer's report
at R.0036.)

Even if, as the Plaintiff contends, he filed the first two claims

under emotional stress, he apparently functioned normally at the time he completed the third claim.

Plaintiff made no attempt, however, at that time to

return the benefit check (No. 774393) for the week ended November 27, 1976,
which he received with his claim for the week ended December 4, 1976.

The

record shows the check and claim were mailed to Plaintiff on November 30, 1976.
(R.0013)
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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..
It should also be noted at this point that Plaintiff appears to have
functioned normally enough tg maintain a full-time job during the weeks in
question and in fact until the end of December 1976.
Finally, and perhaps most significant, is Plaintiff's act of reporting
on his claim for the week ended December 4, 1976, that he had begun work on
November 29, 1976, when, in fact, he had started work on November 18, 1976.

He

also reported on that claim card that he had started work in shipping and
receiving when, according to his own testimony, he had actually started on a
trial basis in the tailor shop.

(R.0025, 0028)

Plaintiff's testimony with respect to his mental state is also vague,
evasive, and self-serving.

He contends on appeal that he had undergone a series

of psychiatric tests and treatment from October 18 to December 1976.

(R.0015)

Plaintiff testified that his visits in December 1976 were for treatment because
of his state of mind:
Administrative Law Judge:

Then, uh, there's a letter dated
December 20, 1976,

Claimant:

That was,

Administrative Law Judge:

Uh, what, what is that?

Claimant:

That was for psychiatric treatment.
I found that I was in need of some
kind of counsel for the state of
mind that I found myself in and
they had a very good psychiatrist
there at the hospital, a doctor Katz.

Administrative Law Judge:

All right. And then there is another
day here, 12-22-76, uh,

Claimant:

That was another appointment with
Dr. Katz.

Administrative Law Judge:

Okay.

Claimant:

Uh, I had a series of appointments
with him. (R.0025)
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.,
However, at another point in the hearing Plaintiff had responded somewhat differently concerning the purpose of his visits with the psychiatrist:
Administrative Law Judge:

Pardon me, this is apparently because
you were physically unable to work
during that time, or • • •

Claimant!

Yeah, that was the period they were
putting me through a series of psychiatric tests at the V. A. Hospital
prior to my surgery. Uh, I went
through a series of tests after being
admitted there as it shows on the admissions card on September 29. And,
uh, this was quite an extensive
series of tests in that, uh, it was
done by a psychiatrist there for the
purpose of determing (sic), uh, you
know, the state of mind and the
ability to, uh, uh,

Administrative Law Judge:

Withstand the surgery.

Claimant:

Withstand, yes.

Administrative Law Judge:

To, to, uh, see whether you, uh,
could safely undergo surgery.

Claimant:

That's true.

(R.0026)

Despite Plaintiff's contentions to the contrary, in view of such conflicting testimony the Appeal Referee and Board of Review reasonably concluded
that Plaintiff's visits with the psychiatrist, at least prior to December 20,
were for the purpose of determining his ability to withstand surgery, rather
than for treatment of his mental state.

The CAPPS Mental Status Examination

Report, added to the record by stipulation of counsel for the parties, is less
than illuminating in this regard, other than to show that the examination was
done on September 27, 1976.

Both the Board of Review and this court are left to

speculate as to why Plaintiff has not offered other documentary evidence as to
his visits with Dr. Katz, if such were indeed for purposes other than postsurgery review.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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,

CONCLUSION

,;

There is substantial evidence demonstrating that Plaintiff understood
the requirement to report his work and earnings.

Despite that knowledge, he

certified that he had no work or earnings for the weeks in question and subsequent thereto reported a false back-to-work date.
The existence of the elements of knowledge and intent was properly
inferred by the Appeal Referee and the Board of Review from the circumstances
and evidence as set forth in the record.

Plaintiff's testimony with respect

to the reasons he failed to report his work and earnings was vague, evasive,
and self-serving and Defendant was not bound to accept such testimony.

The

documentary evidence submitted by Plaintiff through stipulation of counsel
supports Plaintiff's testimony that the psychiatric visits, at least prior to
surgery, were for the purpose of determining whether he could withstand such
surgery, and sheds no light on the question of whether or not Plaintiff was
capable of committing fraud in claiming unemployment insurance benefits.

Thus,

there is substantial evidence in the record supporting the decision of the
Board of Review and it should, therefore, be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
Attorneys for Defendant
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Utah Attorney General
FLOYD G. ASTIN
K. ALLAN ZABEL
Special Assistants
Attorney General
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